The Libertarian Argument

The libertarian argument is rooted deeply in the thesis of self-ownership. Ownership of oneself follows plausibly from a status-based conception of rights, and it is hard to deny its intrinsic appeal. For a libertarian, violations of self-ownership are an affront to the dignity of human beings. Within a libertarian ethos, this affront, as Jeff noted, is tantamount to enslavement--or at least partial enslavement, which is to any degree wrong.

Cohen (1995) recounts the argument this way:

(1) If X is non-contractually obliged to do A for Y, then Y has a right of disposal over X's labour of the sort that a slave-owner has.
(2) If Y has a right of disposal over X's labour of the sort that a slave-owner has, then X is, [to that extent], Y's slave.
(3) It is morally intolerable for anyone to be, in any degree, another's slave. Therefore
(4) It is morally intolerable for X to be non-contractually obliged to do A for Y.

I think Cohen's treatment of the argument is accurate and instructive. If any criticism of libertarianism is to be made (at least within a status-based rights framework), it must take this argument head on. Can one insist on a redistributive taxation scheme without violating self-ownership? It doesn't seem possible to me.